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This thesis will focus on Tarski’s work, so the Section 2 
starts with him, giving an overview of the elements of his theory of 
truth, leading to a presentation of his theorem in 2.3. In the rest of 
the paper, proposals for solving the problem of internalization of 
the concept of truth and the paradoxes arising from this problem 
with some of the proposed solution are considered. Section 3. will 
quickly introduce the Liar paradox and once more explicitly state 
Tarski’s solution, followed by the so called “revenge of the liar”; a 
liar-type sentence which cannot be avoided even by using Tarski’s 
solution to the original liar. After that, Section 4. will introduce 
Kripke’s Theory of Truth and his take on truth and solving the Liar 
paradox using paracomplete logic, while Section 5. will examine 
some further attempts in answering the aforementioned problems 
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1. Tarski’s Theory of Truth 
 
1.1. Importance of Tarski’s Work for Semantics 
 
During the early 20th century, among the philosophers who 
were driven in their work by the virtues promoted by the 
empiricist project, it was not uncommon to approach the concept 
of truth with a high dose of scepticism [13, p. 23]. The champions 
of such a way of doing philosophy were without doubt the 
positivists of the Vienna Circle. Keeping in mind their reluctance to 
accept or deal with metaphysical notions which could not be 
grounded in hard science, it is not surprising that a concept which 
has a long history of dubiousness, in the form of logical antinomies 
as well as well as supposing a link between language and the 
world around us, is regarded with suspicion. This suspicion was 
obvious towards any semantic notion, as well as semantics itself, 
and the reason is clear from this quote from Carnap: 
While many philosophers today urge the construction of a 
system of semantics, others, especially, among my fellow 
empiricists, are rather sceptical. They seem to think that 
pragmatics - as a theory of the use of language -is 
unobjectionable, along with syntax a purely formal analysis; 
but semantics arouses suspicions. They are afraid that a 
discussions of propositions -as distinguished from sentences 
expressing them- and of truth- as distinguished from 
confirmation by observations - will open the back door to 
speculative metaphysics, which was put out at the front door. 
[4] 
In this respect, the project of the Vienna Circle was closely tied 
with that of the Lvov-Warsaw school, which, too, wanted to 
develop scientific philosophy based on mathematical logic as a 
paradigm of rational thought. Tarski, like Carnap, wrote about 
scepticism towards semantics mentioning antinomies as one of 
the reasons for such caution: 
 
Concepts from the domain of semantics have traditionally 
played a prominent part in the discussions of philosophers, 
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logicians and philologists. Nevertheless they have long been 
regarded with a certain scepticism. From the historical point of 
view this scepti- cism was well founded; for, although the 
content of the semantical concepts, as they occur in colloquial 
language, is clear enough, yet all attempts to characterize this 
content more precisely have failed, and various discussions in 
which these concepts appeared and which were based on quite 
plausible and seemingly evident premises, had often led to 
paradoxes and antinomies. [23] 
 
Tarski’s work, as well as Carnap’s and Gödel’s for example, lead to 
the dissolution of this scepticism towards semantics and thanks to 
them, the importance of semantics in contemporary logic is 
unquestionable [25, p. 4]. When it comes to the notion of truth, 
Tarski’s project was driven by an idea of demonstrating that the 
concept of truth could be defined in terms of other notations 
whose scientific examination was possible [10, p. 38] [6, p.535]. 
Also, this kind of general scepticism towards the concept of truth 
is a source of the problem of priority with regards to proving the 
Undefinability of truth theorem, which is covered here in 2.3.1. 
It is important to note that Tarski did not define the notion 
of truth as commonly understood, or in other words he did not 
define truth in everyday sense of the word [22, p. 153]. Rather, he 
defined a notion of truth for a large class of formalized languages 
L, were truth is defined in L and whose definition is applicable to 
the sentences of L. Although Tarski writes about truth in formal 
systems and explicitly states at the beginning of his seminal 1933. 
paper that he wishes to give a materially adequate and formally 
correct definition of a term ‘true sentence’ [22, p. 187], his goal in 
constructing a theory of truth is indeed philosophically deeper in a 
sense that the result he wishes to obtain is constructing a 
materially accurate and formally con- sistent definition of the 
classical notion of truth (or being true) where ‘true’ means 
‘corresponding with reality’ [12, p. 285]. Nevertheless, Tarski early 
on expresses great doubt about the possibility of defining truth for 
colloquial languages and states that he shall focus on formalized 
ones instead. More- over, he argues that, since colloquial 
languages are semantically closed, it is impossible to create a 
satisfactory definition of ‘true’ [21, p. 537]. This is due to the 
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universality of those kind of languages [7, p. 36, 58], which means 
that they contain all of the expressions we expect them to contain, 
the names of these expressions and semantic terms like ‘true’ that 
refer to the sentences of these languages. 
For that reason definitions are needed of the terms “formal 
language”, “formal correctness” and “material adequacy”, so that 
Tarski’s position can be properly understood. 
A formal language is the one in which: 
1. a description is given in structural terms of all the signs 
with which the expressions of a language are formed, 
2. among all of the possible expressions, sentences are 
distinguished only by means of structural properties, 
3. a structural description is given for sentences called 
axioms, 
4. by rules of inference, structural operations are embodied 
which permit the transformation of one sentence into 
another. 
Object language is a language L under discussion, while the 
metalanguage is a language M in which definitions of object 
language L are given. A met- alanguage M contains a copy of object 
language L, and M can talk about sentences and syntax of L. 
Furthermore, M contains a predicate True, which we read as ‘is 
true in L’. 
Formal correctness is a condition that a definition of the 
predicate True should be in a form For all x, True(x) if and only if 
ψ(x), where the predicate True never occurs in ψ. 
  Material adequacy, as a condition for a satisfactory 
definition of ‘true’, means that the sentences that satisfy ψ should 
be exactly those which we would regard as being true sentences of 
L, and that this fact should be provable from the axioms of the 
metalanguage. Material adequacy is what is also called Convention 
T. 
 
1.2. Convention T 
 
In the philosophical pursuit of the definition of truth, one 
can ask about   a set of sentences if its members are true. Then, 
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one can try to identify a property that all true sentences have in 
common or a method which gives an answer for every sentence if 
it is true or false. But, these are not the questions we will deal 
with, since Tarski has a different project in mind. He is not trying 
to find a property which all true sentences have, but a condition 
which every theory of truth should fulfil to be an adequate theory 
[18, p. 82]. In other words, his goal is not directly to separate true 
sentences from false, but adequate theories from non-adequate 
theories. 
Therefore, the purpose of the Convention T is to provide 
the condition upon which a sentence of L is true, or in other words 
the condition under which a sentence falls under the extension of 
‘true’ and not to say if the sentence really is true. The extension of 
‘true’ indicates the range of appli- cability of ‘true’ by naming the 
particular objects that it denotes, in this case, true sentences, 
while being true, on the other hand, is a property of sentences. So, 
the Convention T determines the criterion for sentences to be- 
come members of the extension of ‘true’. That condition should 
also preserve our intuitions on truth. Hence, in cases where we 
known that a sentence is true, for example “2+3=5”, any proposed 
condition must put “2+3=5” into the extension of ‘true’. In cases 
such as the negation of “2+3=5”, the condi- tions should put that 
sentence outside of the extension of ‘true’. Moreover, non-
sentences should also lie outside the extension of ‘true’. The 
reason why Convention T merely provides a condition upon which 
a sentence of L is true is the existence of sentences for which we 
do not know if they fall under the extension of ‘true’. For example, 
we do not know if Goldbach’s Conjecture falls under ‘true’, but we 
are not required to know which sentences are true to have a 
definition of ‘true’. Instead, we only need to explicitly say under 
which condition it would be true. 
 
Convention T. A proposed definition of truth for the 
language of arithmetic is adequate if it implies all 
sentences of the form: 
(T) ⌈ψ⌉ is true if and only if ψ, when ψ  is a sentence of the 
language of arithmetic and ⌈ψ⌉ is its Gödel number; and it 




So, given any language L, Tarski argues that an adequate 
notion of truth for L would have  to satisfy,  for each sentence x, ‘x’ 
is true if and only if x [22, p. 187]. A paradigmatic example in 
English is the sentence ‘Snow is white’ which, by convention T, is 
true if and only if snow is white. The characteristic of 
correspondence, which is enveloped by such a notion of truth, 
finds its justification in, what Tarski would deem as an 
Aristotelian, definition of truth that establishes truth as 
correspondence formulated in Aristotel’s dictum [12, p. 285]: 
 
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is 
false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that 
it is not, is true. 
 
What Convention T states is that a predicate T is an adequate 
definition  of truth if in the metalanguage all sentences which are 
obtained from ‘T(x) if and only if p’ by substituting for ‘x’ a 
structural-descriptive name of any sentence of L and for the ‘p’ the 
translation of this sentence into the meta- language. In other 
words, if we take the language of Gödel numbers as our object 
language and arithmatization as translation of that language to the 
metalanguage, then some predicate in the metalanguage T is 
adequate if and only if the following theorems can be proven in 
the that metalanguage: 
a) All the theorems of the form T (x) → p, where x is a 
particular Gödel number and p is the translation of that 
Gödel number, and that 
b) for all y, if T(y) can be proven in the metalanguage then y is 
a sentence of the object language. 
With regards to defining truth, note the term convention in 
Convention T. It is important not to confuse Convention T with a 
definition of truth. What the Convention provides is a scheme 
which, when we substitute x with a name of a concrete expression 
and p with that expression, becomes a partial definition of truth. It 
is the conjunction of all of the partial definitions that is the general 
definition of truth. [10, p. 38] 
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1.2.1. Convention T and the Liar 
 
Although the relation between the Liar paradox and 
Tarski’s response to it will be thoroughly examined in the Section 
3., a short introduction will be presented now, as it will shed light 
on the motivation for the establishment of the Convention T. 
Moreover, we will show in 2.3 how Tarski’s theorem is proven by 
constructing a Liar-type sentence. 
The Liar’s Paradox is one of the oldest and most commonly 
known para- dox. It can be stated as: 
1) This statement is not true. 
The paradox arises since the sentence is true if it is not true and 
vice versa [8, p. 55]. Alfred Tarski has shown a way to solve this 
paradox, although in a specific situation, that is when a formal 
language does not contain its true predicate T [22, p. 262]. This is 
where we arrive at Tarski’s Convention T. 
So, since a central element of the Convention T is that the 
truth predicate T is not expressible in the object language L; 
instead, it is a predicate of the metalanguage ML which will take 
descriptions of the statements in the object language, it follows 
that (1) is not interpretable in the object language L because of the 
presence of the truth predicate T. In other words, it is not a well 
formed formula. 
We can interpret it in ML as: 
1)* ¬T ((1)) 
But again, this will not be a well formed formula since 1)* contains 
T and T can only be applied to sentences of L whose 1)* cannot be 
a member of because it contains T which is not expressible in L. 
In this way, the paradoxes can be avoided with the use of 
metalanguages by showing that antinomies such as 1) are in fact 







1.3. Tarski’s Theorem and its Consequences 
 
Tarski has shown the usefulness of metalanguages in 
dealing with semantic paradoxes, but the importance of the 
metalanguage goes beyond just dealing with the Liar. As Tarski 
demonstrates, in his theorem on the undefinability of truth 
predicate, without such a system of metalanguages, it is 
impossible to define truth for formal systems. Tarski’s theorem 
shows that the resources of the metalanguage ML must go beyond 
the resources of the object language L, or in other words that it 
necessitates the use of a metalanguage ML that is expressively 
more powerful than the object language L for which it provides 
semantics [22, p. 254]. The proof is constructed by using the 
Diagonal lemma which states: 
Diagonal Lemma. Let Σ be a theory that represents every 
recursive function, and let A(x) be a formula in the language of Σ 
with just ‘x’ free. Then there is a sentence G such that Σ ⊢ tt ≡ 
A(⌈tt⌉), where ⌈tt⌉ is a Gödel number of a sentence G. 
G is a sentence that says of itself that it has whatever 
property that A(x) expresses [20, p. 200]. Through this lemma, the 
existence of self-referential sentences is mathematically provable. 
Theorem 1. Tarski’s theorem 
(a) In whatever way predicate T is defined in metalanguage ML, 
it will be possible to derive from it the negation of one of the 
sentences which were described in the condition for the convention 
T; 
(b) assuming that the class of all provable sentences of the 
metatheory is consistent, it is impossible to construct an adequate 
definition of truth in the sense of convention T on the basis of the 
metalanguage ML. 
To prove the theorem, we will take T(z) to mean that the 
statement rep- resented by the Gödel number z is true, while we 
will use Q(y,y,z) to say that if we put ‘y’, the expression of the Gödel 
number y, into the statement repre- sented by the Gödel number y, 
then we will get the statement represented by the Gödel number z. 
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Using Gödel numbering, we can construct a sentence 2) (∃y)(¬T 
(z) ∧ Q(y, y, z)) which states that there exists some Gödel number y 
such that it is not the case that the statement which corresponds 
to the Gödel number z is true and that that same number is the 
arithmatization of the formula created by putting the expression 
of the Gödel number of 2) into that same formula. 
If we assume that 2) is true, then the first part of the 
conjunction says that it is not the case that the proposition 
represented by z is true, while the second part says that the 
proposition represented by z is a result of putting the Gödel 
number of sentence 2) into the arithmetization of itself, which will 
result in the original formula. Therefore, it is not the case that 
T(z), while the translation of z in the metalanguage is true, which 
violates Convention T. 
If we assume that 2) is false, we get a sentence 3) (∀z)(T 
(z)∨¬Q(y, y, z)). By instantiating z for the Gödel number of the 
sentence 2), Q(y,y,z) becomes true, so by disjunctive syllogism T(z) 
holds. Since z is the Gödel number of sentence 2) Convention T 
must hold, which contradicts our assumption that 2) is false. 
Now, we will present a cleaner proof of Tarski’s theorem 
[8, p. 63, 68]. 
Proof. Let T1 be a predicate which arithmetically codes the 
semantic notion of true. 
Let sb3 be a 3-placed function symbol, which is an 
arithmetical translation of syntactic substitution in a given 
formula, of a given expression for a particular variable. 
So, we can write sb(y, y, 13) to denote the Gödel number of 
a formula created by substitution in a formula with a Gödel 
number y, of the expression of the Gödel number y, for the 
variable with the Gödel number 13, 13 being the Gödel 
number of ‘y’, thus achieveing self-reference. 
Now, we can create a formula 
a) ¬Tsb(y, y, 13) with h being the Gödel number of a). 
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By substituting h for y we get 
b) ¬Tsb(h, h, 13) with sb(h,h,13) being the Gödel 




The proof of Tarski’s theorem shows that truth is 
undefinable in the object language and it also demonstrates that 
no consistent theory of truth for a language that one can formulate 
within that exact language implies the (T)-sentences. Moreover, 
such theories are inconsistent with the (T)- sentences. 
Thus, to use ‘true’, we need to construct a hierarchy of languages, 
L0, L1, L2,..., where each language Ln+1 has a truth predicate Tn+1 that 
can only be applied to the sentences of Lm, where m ≤ n holds. In 
this case, L0 is what we call object language and Ln+1 
metalanguages. 
However, there are several issues with such a hierarchy 
some of which will be covered in 3.1 and 4.1, while we will briefly 
mention one right away. The issue in question concerns the fact 
that by building higher and higher levels of this hierarchy of 
languages it is conceivable that at one point we will get to a 
language in which we formulate questions and state results of any 
kind. Intuitively, the best candidate for this language would be a 
natural language, for example Croatian [21, p. 537]. But, it is 
precisely this kind of language that Tarski deems inconsistent, so 
the problem is how to explain the link between truth as 
understood in formal languages and truth in everyday sense of the 
word. Thus, every time we go one step higher, the metalanguage 
we find ourselves in will never have a feature of universality. 
Instead, that language will always be merely a part of our everyday 
language [7, p. 59]. 
 
1.3.1. Question of Priority 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to shortly present the 
question of priority of proving the theorem on undefinability of 
truth between Tarski and Gödel. This question arose from the fact 
that Tarski’s and Gödel’s theorems were consequences of the 
Diagonalization lemma and as such are closely interrelated [11, p. 
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153]. For example, that the provable sentences are definable in the 
first order language of arithmetic, but the truths are not is a conse- 
quence of Tarski’s theorem. But, the fact that the axioms can be 
true and the inference rules preserve truth, while at the same time 
some truths are not provable, is the central point of Gödel’s first 
incompleteness theorem. 
Tarski did use Gödel’s methods in proving the theorem on 
the undefinability of truth, but claimed that his results were 
obtained independently of Gödel’s work. Gödel, on the other side, 
did realize the discrepancy between formal definability of 
provability and the formal undefinability of truth which ended in 
discovery of incompleteness [11, p. 157]. A possible explanation 
for him not explicitly stating the undefinability result can be found 
in the wide scepticism with regards to semantic notion that was 
mentioned in Section 1., although when it comes to Tarski, it was 
precisely that scepticism which motivated him to engage in an 
examination of the concept of truth. Fur- thermore, Tarski 
developed a truth-definition and examined the definability of the 
concept of truth in Peanno’s Arithmetic (PA) and stronger 
theories. On the other side, Gödel had no such truth-definition [25, 
p. 9] and only considered the problem of expressibility of the set 
of ’true’ numbers in PA. 
Woleński [24, p. 459] stresses the importance of using 
non-finitary devices, as opposed to finitary ones. As Gödel worked 
on the Hilbert program and his proof of completeness theorem 
was an important step on the way to finitary metamathematics, 
while Tarski’s semantic definition of truth became the first step 
toward model theory, whose formulation needed non-finitary 
devices. Woleński claims that this non-finitary character of 
Tarski’s work is what separates it from that of Gödel and as such 
only Tarski can claim the discovering of the theorem. 
 
 
2. The Liar Paradox 
 
The Liar paradox is an umbrella term for a wide range of 
semantic paradoxes, but in this paper by the Liar paradox we 
mean those paradoxes which occur because of the explicit self-
reference, that some sentences exhibit, resulting in a contradiction 
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and which in classical logic imply absurdity. That is why the Liar 
sentences have become the core of arguments against classical 
logic, since it is because of some key features of classical logic that 
allow for the existence of the paradox that result in absurdity, 
through the explosion of consequences [1]. Some of these 
reactions are the arguments for logics that are paracomplete, 
which we will cover in Section 4. when talking about Kripke and 
his theory of truth, and paraconsistent, on which we will give a 
short introduction in Section 5. 
The Liar is constructed by using a truth predicate T, where the 
predicate T is a truth predicate for language L only if T(⌈ψ⌉) is 
well-formed for every sentence ψ of L; the conditionals from the 
Convention T, ψ implies ⌈ψ⌉ and ⌈ψ⌉ implies ψ; and the laws of 
classical logic. Here we can see the difference between paradoxes 
and contradictions. Unlike contradictions, which are inconsistent 
propositions that imply falsity of atleast one of our assumptions, 
paradoxes are arguments with acceptable and often intuitive 
assumptions which we deem correct, but which end up in a 
contradiction [20, p. 198]. That is why paradoxes invite us to reject 
our previous assumptions; definability of T in the language where 
we use it in case of Tarski or logical laws in case of paracomplete 
and paraconsistent logics. Consider the sentence: 
 
4) This sentence is not true. 
 
If 4) is true, then it says of itself that it is not true; and if it 
is not    true, then it says of itself that it is true. Since, in the context 
of formal languages, every sentence needs to be true or not true, 
the sentence 4) is both true and untrue, which is a contradiction 
because it violates the law of non-contradiction. 
Formally written, this is how one gets to a contradiction: 
1.  T(⌈ψ⌉) ∨ ¬T(⌈ψ⌉). 
2. Suppose T(⌈ψ⌉). 
3. ψ, since ⌈ψ⌉ implies ψ. 
4. ¬T(⌈ψ⌉), since ψ says of itself that it is not true. 
KRITiKA 
40 
5. Therefore, T(⌈ψ⌉) ∧ ¬T(⌈ψ⌉). 
6. Suppose ¬T(⌈ψ⌉). 
7. ψ, since ψ says of itself that it is true. 
8. T(ψ), since ψ implies ⌈ψ⌉. 
9. Therefore, ¬T(⌈ψ⌉) ∧ T(⌈ψ⌉). 
10. Finally, by the disjunction principle we conclude T(⌈ψ⌉) ∧ 
¬T(⌈ψ⌉). 
Tarski thought that the Liar shows the ordinary notion of 
truth to be incoherent or too vague, and that it is needed to 
replace it with a more sci- entifically respectable one. When it 
comes to formalized languages, Tarski’s way of dealing with Liar-
type sentences is through a differentiation between metalanguage 
and object language as we have shown in 2.2. So, because of the 
presence of the truth predicate T in the object language a Liar 
sentence is not a well formed formula, which is a result of Tarski’s 
theorem. But, as we will show in 3.1, this is a pyrrhic victory for 
Tarski. 
 
2.1 Revenge of the Liar 
 
5) This statement is true. 
 
Following Tarski’s result, since this sentence contains its 
true predicate it is not true nor is it not not true. In fact, it is not 
well formed, since that sentence is not something which we can 
call true or not true, analogously to a sentence “Tomorrow is (not) 
true.”. Therefore, we can divide sentences on true, false and not 
well formed and none of the sentences can be in more than one 
category. So, in which category should the next sentence go: 
6) This sentence is not true or it is not well formed. 
 
Since this sentence contains its truth predicate in the same 
way as a sentence 5), it is not well formed and as such cannot be 
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true or false. But, it says of itself that it is not well formed, which 
means that it is true and it can be true only if it is well formed, so 
we arrive at a contradiction [21, p. 539]. 
Unlike the cases of sentence 5) where one can say that it is 
neither true nor not true since it is not a well formed formula, 
which is tenable, the same approach in this scenario would 
require that we accept that some sentences are not well formed 
nor are they well formed. But even if we accepted that, a further 
problem emerges with a sentence: 
7) This statement is not true, or it is not well formed, or it is 
not well formed nor not well formed. 
It soon becomes obvious that by postulating these new 
differentiations, one falls in to an infinite regress of ever new 
forms of Liar-type sentences and that even the metalanguage - 
object language distinction cannot resolve or dissolve the paradox. 
These revenge problems are common for any proposed solution 
for Liar-type sentences [1]. Once a solution has been proposed for 
the Liar paradox, we define Liar sentences with a certain notion, in 
this case well-formedness. At this point, we use that same notion 
to create new sentences which we cannot solve since they contain 
that same notion [2, p. 4]. We shall see in 4.3 and 5.1, how one can 




3. Kripke’s Theory of Truth 
 
When considering ways to define truth and to find a solution 
for the Liar paradox, one can turn to the ingredients needed to 
create the paradox to see what one can change or omit from his 
system to solve or dissolve the problem. As it was mentioned in 
Section 3., there is a so called paracomplete approach to this issue. 
The idea is that the Liar paradox arises from a mistaken intuition 
formulated in the Law of the Excluded middle (LEM). One such 
approach was put forward by Saul Kripke and in the core of his 
proposed theory is the idea that sentences can have a third value, 
along side true and false, undefined. 
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This theory finds its justification in a critique of the hierarchy 
of languages developed by Tarski as a result of his Undefinability 
theorem and Russell, which resulted in his type-theory. By using a 
three-valued logic, Kripke is also circumventing the consequences 
of Tarski’s theorem, as it was developed in a bivalent system. 
Kripke starts his seminal 1975. paper “Outline of a Theory of 
Truth” by showing that the paradoxality of a sentence needs not to 
be a matter of its intrinsic, syntactical feature. Kripke invites us to 
consider the following example [9, p. 691]: 
8) Most (i.e., a majority) of Nixon’s assertions about Watergate 
are false. 
Intuitively, there is nothing wrong with this sentence in a 
sense that it has some features because of which we would doubt 
its well-formedness for example. We can find out the truth value of 
8) by collecting all of Nixon’s assertions about Watergate and 
assessing each for truth or falsity. If most of them are false, then 8) 
is true. 
But, Kripke goes on and invites us to suppose that 8) is 
Jones’s sole assertion about Watergate and that the amount of 
Nixon’s true and false assertions about Watergate are evenly 
balanced, with one exception: 
9) Everything Jones says about Watergate is true. 
 
In this case, 8) and 9) are both paradoxical, although we 
are not dealing with dubious sentences at all. Thus, Kripke 
concludes, we should not examine the intrinsic qualities that will 
enable us to pinpoint non-well-formed sentences which lead to 
the liar paradox [9, p. 692]. It is the empirical fact which creates 
the paradox and for Kripke, it’s not an uncommon thing: 
 
The versions of the Liar paradox which use empirical 
predicates already point up one major aspect of the 
problem: many, probably most, of our ordinary assertions 
about truth and falsity are liable, if the empirical facts are 




Kripke’s proposed theory is based on an analysis of the 
formentioned problem as well as critique of Tarski’s hierarchical 
solution, which is covered in the next subsection. Although Kripke 
attacks the idea that each sentence has a fixed level in the 
hierarchy of languages according to its syntactic form, he still 
keeps the idea of having a hierarchy but it is not an explicit part of 
the syntax. 
 
3.1. Critique of Tarski’s Hierarchy of Languages 
 
Kripke is presenting a number of objections to the idea of 
the hierarchy of languages that are mostly grounded in common 
sense and natural languages. Therefore, when talking about 
Tarski’s Hierarchy of Languages, Kripke is actually talking about a 
transference of Tarski’s object language - metalanguage 
distinction from formal languages to natural ones and it is worth 
stressing again that Tarski explicitly states in his 1933. paper that 
he will not deal with natural languages since he considered them 
inconsistent by their nature. 
The first objection that Kripke presents is the one we 
mentioned in 4.1. It says that Tarski-type hierarchies assume that 
the level in the hierarchy which a sentence occupies and the fact of 
its paradoxality is determined by its syntax, which it is not 
following Kripke’s example with sentences 8) and 9). Therefore, 
whatever truth theory we are constructing it has to allow 
statements about truthfulness to be “risky” [9, p. 692] and by that 
Kripke means that sentences involving truth have a possibility to 
become paradoxical if the empirical facts create a situation where 
such thing occurs. 
The second objection concerns our ordinary notion of 
truth, which, commonsensically, should not be an object of 
stratification, but one, unified concept of ‘true’. Further on, Kripke 
states that in case of the hierarchical approach, one should attach 
an explicit or implicit subscript to his utterance of true or false, so 
we can see at which level a sentence is in discourse [9, p. 695]. 
This feature is not present in our language usage, so it cannot be 
true of our language. Although this is not a knockout argument 
against Tarski- type hierarchy, a problem arises when we have two 
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sentences, each saying something about the truthfulness of the 
other. Consider Kripke’s example: 
 
Dean says:  
10) Everything Dean says about Watergate is false. and 
Nixon says:  
11) Everything Dean says about Watergate is false. 
 
Since 10) says something about the truthfulness of 11) it 
should be of   a higher level than 11) and vice versa. If 10) and 11) 
are sentences on the same level, neither can talk about the 
truthfulness of the other, otherwise the higher can talk about the 
lower, but not conversely. In the same time, there is intuitively no 
problem with assigning value to these two sentences. 
Lastly, Kripke points out that in everyday language usage it 
is not just the case that we are not using such hierarchies, but it is 
also not clear how would we use it for epistemological reasons. It 
is the problem of knowing on which level the assertions of others 
are, that creates the problem for hierarchies. 
 
3.2. Kripke’s Many-valued Solution 
 
Following the issues that arose with 8), Kripke claims that 
8) is meaningful, but it can and cannot “express a proposition” [9, 
p. 700], so we need a semantical scheme for partially defined 
predicates and a usage of three-valued logic; Kleene’s strong 
three-valued logic is used in Kripke’s 1975. paper. In Kleene’s 
strong three-valued logic ¬P is true (false) if P is false (true), and 
undefined if P is undefined. A disjunction is true if at least one 
disjunct is true regardless of whether the other disjunct is true, 
false, or undefined; it is false if both disjuncts are false; undefined, 
otherwise. 
So, in Kripke’s theory the truth predicate applies to some, 
but not all of the sentences of the language and as such the 
partially defined predicate has truth values of true or false, when 
it is applied to one of the sentences for which the predicate has 
been defined, and otherwise it gets the value undefined that is 
denoted by ‘u’. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of partial 
models [9, p. 700] to accommodate for partially defined 
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predicates. In a partial model, given a non-empty domain D, an n-
place predicate Pn is interpreted by a pair (S1, S2) of disjoint n-
place relations on the domain of the model (disjoint subsets of D). 
S1 is called the extension of Pn and S2 its anti-extension. In the 
model, Pn is true of the objects in S1, false of the objects in S2, and 
undefined otherwise. The extension and anti-extension are 
mutually exclusive, but they do not necessarily exhaust the 
domain and it is this feature that explains the existence of 
paradoxical sentences, by putting them outside of the union of 
extension and anti-extension, S1 ∪ S2. 
Kripke constructs a hierarchy of languages of his own, but 
the level in a hierarchy which a sentence occupies is not 
determined by its syntax [9, p. 703]. Kripke starts with a language 
L(Λ,Λ), where Λ denotes an empty set, that is the extension and 
anti-extension of the truth predicate T are empty sets, so the 
predicate T is undefined. Then, we build up a hierarchy by 
defining T with a pair (S1, S2) in a way that for any α, the language 
Lα+1 is like Lα except that T is interpreted by the (S1, S2), where S1 
is the set of Gödel numbers (ψ) of sentences ψ true in Lα and S2 is 
the set of Gödel numbers (ψ) of sentences ψ false in Lα. While 
building a higher-level language Lα+1 the interpretation of T is 
extended by giving it a definite truth value for cases that were 
undefined in Lα, but no truth value that was defined in Lα can 
become undefined in Lα+1. So, the interpretation of T in Lα+1 
extends the interpretation of T in Lα and we define a new level of 
language Lβ by T being the union of all the extensions of T in L0, ... , 
Lα, where α ≤ β and the same goes for the anti-extension. 
During the construction of these levels, we reach a certain point 
where Lα = Lα+1, which we call a fixed point and denote it as Lσ [9, 
p. 705]. Since it is a fixed point, Lσ is a language that contains its 
own predicate T, because it assigns T to all of the sentences T can 
be assigned to and Lσ cannot be further extended. As such, it is an 
adequate concept for our notion of truth. At this point, some 
sentence ψ is true in Lσ, if and only if T (ψ) is true   in Lσ, which is 
analogical to the Convention T. This result contradicts the 
undefinability theorem, because in the same time this 
construction satisfies Convention T, but still there is a language 
that contains its predicate T. 
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Now, Kripke introduces the notion of (un)groundedness. 
For a sentence ψ of L, ψ is grounded if it has a truth value in Lσ and 
if ψ does not get a truth value in Lσ it is ungrounded [9, p. 706]. So, 
the idea is that if some sentence ψ contains a predicate T, its truth 
value has to be determined by examining the sentences of higher 
order. If at Lσ we have sentences that do not contain a predicate T 
and the truth value of ψ can be determined through them, then ψ 
is grounded, and if not then it is ungrounded [9, p. 694]. 
Kripke’s solution for the Liar paradox is showing that 
those kind of sen- tences are ungrounded and as such they do not 
have a truth value. In other words, Liar sentences are undefined or 
they suffer from a truth-value gap. 
 
3.3. Revenge of the Liar II 
 
In Section 4. a new proposal for solving the Liar paradox 
was introduced. It says that the Liar-type sentences are undefined 
and as such they are neither true nor are they not-true. But, as 
Kripke himself points out in his 1975. paper, the proposed theory 
suffers from a strengthened version of the Liar in a similar way 
Tarski’s solution does [9, p. 714]. Consider a sentence: 
12) This sentence is either false or undefined. 
If this sentence is true then it is false or undefined, while if it is 
false or undefined, then it is true. Hence, 12) is paradoxical. 
Further on, Kripke defines paradoxical sentences as those that are 
neither true nor false in a fixed point. Consider a sentence that 
states just that: 
13) The sentence 4) is undefined. 
This sentence says something about 4) which is true in 
Kripke’s paracomplete approach. But, during the construction of 
Kripke’s hierarchy, the liar sentences such as 4) never get a truth 
value and we assign to them the value of undefined only once we 
have finished the construction. At this point, we cannot add new 
sentences to the construction. Hence, to express 13) we need to 
add a truth value of true to it, but we cannot since, 4) becomes un- 
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defined only after we have already finished our construction [19, 
p. 221]. We know that 13) is true for Lσ, because in Lσ a Liar 
sentence is ungrounded and as such it is undefined, but 13) is not 
expressible in Lσ. Therefore, the paracomplete approach cannot 
state its own solution to the Liar paradox. In other words, there 
are truths of Lσ, not expressible in Lσ. This is obvious once we 
understand that the third value of undefined that we have added is 
a result of the reflection in the metalanguage on the inability to 
ascribe one of two classical values to a sentence [5, p. 347]. That 
means that, in order to express 13), we need to use a 




4. Paraconsistent Logic and Truth 
 
Until now, we have examined two different approaches to 
truth and semantic paradoxes. One, here presented by Tarski, is a 
classical, or orthodox, approach by which we mean obeying the 
rules of classical logic, most notably its bivalence. The second one, 
presented through Kripke, is a paracomplete one, which means 
that we are dropping the law of the excluded middle in a sense of 
adding a third value along side true and false, that of undefined, to 
accommodate the fact that a sentence can be neither true nor 
false. The last that we will cover in this paper is the paraconsistent 
approach. 
In paraconsistent logic it is the principle of explosion of 
consequences that is rejected. So, A, ¬A ⊢ B does not hold. In other 
words, contradictions do not imply absurdity [14, p. 75]. It is 
important to note that a certain logic can be both paraconsistent 
and paracomplete, but in this section we will concentrate on those 
that are paraconsistent and non-paracomplete. One such logic is 
proposed and defended by Priest in his 1979. paper “The Logic of 
Paradox” [16], where he devises such a system and calls it Logic of 
Paradox; LP. 
Although LP can be understood as a three-valued logic, 
analogously with Kleen’s strong three-valued logic Kripke used in 
his 1975. paper, in case of LP there are no truth-value gaps, but 
truth-value gluts [14, p. 109]. That means that, instead of the third 
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value being neither true nor false, the value is both true and false. 
Still, there is a substantial difference between the two three-
valued logics, moreover Priest even criticises the truth-value gap 
approach. 
The critique runs as follows, if there is no fact that makes a 
sentence ψ true, then there is a fact that makes ¬ψ  true, and that 
fact  is  that there  is no fact that makes ψ true [15, p. 65]. In other 
words, suppose that ψ is a sentence, and suppose that there is 
nothing in virtue of which ψ is true. Then this is something in 
virtue of which ¬ψ is true, even though we may not know what it 
is. From this it follows that a sentence ψ  has to have a truth value 
of true or false, therefore there are no truth-value gaps. But this 
does not mean that ψ cannot have both truth values, or have a 
truth- value glut. In other words, accepting truth-value gluts 
means accepting the existence of true contradictions. A position 
which defends such a view is called dialetheism. 
Paraconsistent logics can produce their own interpretation 
for the truth predicate in a similar manner as Kripke did with his 
hierarchy of interpretations [1]. The idea is to start with a 
language L0, which does not contain its truth predicate and the 
extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate T are empty 
sets. We then build up our hierarchy by extending the exten- sion 
and anti-extension with new sentences. The main difference 
between this construction and that of Kripke is that the extension 
and anti-extension are exhaustive but not mutually exclusive. So, 
there is no such thing that lies outside the extension and anti-
extension, but there are things that are members of both. This is 
the idea of a glut mentioned before. 
There are a number of strengths that this kind of approach 
exhibits. First of all, we have seen that Tarski’s Convention T easily 
leads to contradictions, which are blocked by Tarski by saying that 
the predicate T cannot be ex- pressed in the object language, so a 
liar sentences cannot be formulated. But, one can construct a 
paraconsistent Tarskian truth-theory which contains its own 
predicate T [14, p. 46]. Second, while other theories are 
constructed so they would solve or dissolve the paradoxical 
sentences, those same sentences are used as arguments for 
paraconsistancy and dialetheism [16, p. 220]. Com- pared to 
Kripke’s paracomplete approach, while Kripke cannot state its 
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own solution to the paradox, the paraconsistent one seems to not 
have any issues with it. Thirdly, if logic wants to examine natural 
reasoning in natural languages, its models should coincide with 
those natural phenomenons. Tarski claimed that the universality 
of everyday language is the source of seman- tic antinomies, like 
that of the liar. Therefore, if we endorse such a view of natural 
languages, then we should also endorse a dialetheist position 
since it accommodates how natural language works [16, p. 225]. 
 
4.1. Revenge of the Liar III 
 
Even though the paraconsistent, or dialetheist, solution 
seems elegant, although definitely not non-contentious, it is not 
completely free from some issues. Revenge of the Liar is an 
adequacy objection in a sense that a lan- guage is inadequate due 
to its expressive limitation and in the similar way as with Tarski’s 
and Kripke’s solution, we have an expressivity problem with 
regards to dialetheist position [3, p. 743]. 
The position presented in this Section holds the following 
true: 
14) Every sentence is either only true or only false or both true 
and false. 
But, as Bromand showed [3, p. 745], Priest’s account, like 
those of Tarski and Kripke, introduces novel kinds of semantic 
concepts which cannot be adequately expressed in that same 
approach. In this case, it is the notions of only true and only false 
that are contentious. The problem lies in the fact that, when these 
notions are expressed in the language in question, we are led to 
triviality. In other words, since only true and only false cannot be 
properly expressed, as a result we get that being only true is equal 
to only false, that is, every sentence becomes true. For example, 
lets show the problem with only false. A sentence ψ is only false if 
and only if ψ is not true in L. Assume that L contains a predicate Fx 
that defines ψ as ψ is only false in L. There will be a sentence ψ 
that says F(⌈ψ⌉). We can prove in the metalanguage that ψ is true 
in L if and only if F(⌈ψ⌉) is true in L if and only if ψ is only false in L 
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if and only if ψ is not true in L. But, sentences of L cannot be both 
true and not true in L. Therefore, L cannot express only false in L. 
 
 
5. Pursuit of Truth 
 
In this paper, we examined three approaches to the notion of 
truth, as well as three proposals for solving Liar-type sentences. 
Now, in this last section, we want to take a step back and look at 
what these approaches can tell us about the link between logic, 
language and truth. 
As we have seen in previous sections, for accomplishing the 
goal of defining truth we are constructing a formal account of 
truth by building models. 
The purpose of these models is to capture certain features of 
natural lan- guages and of our ordinary notion of truth, like those 
of capture (ψ ⊢ T(⌈ψ⌉) and release (T(⌈ψ⌉) ⊢ ψ), that are central 
for constructing Liar-type sentences for example, or 
intersubstitutability of T (ψ) and ψ, that the attempts of 
internalizing the concept of truth we examined wanted to achieve 
and maintain. So, these models are idealizations of natural 
languages, while the formalizations of truth are about capturing 
our intuitions of truth in the truth predicates of those models. 
Now, the problem is in detecting, if these models function in a 
similar enough way as natural languages and if the truth 
predicates function in a similar enough way as truth does in natu- 
ral languages. Note that we say in a similar enough way because 
we are talking about idealizations of natural languages. The 
problem of detecting this compatibility of features is actually the 
problem of adequacy. Through this paper, we have examined the 
problem of adequacy through Liar-type sentences. 
We have shown why and how both natural and formal 
languages give rise to Liar-type sentences. Their existence in 
undoubted and what an adequate model needs to show is how, 
despite these paradoxical sentences, our truth predicate achieves 
the features we want it to have and what are the relevant features 
of our languages that are involved in it. The issue that repeatedly 
reemerged is the revenge problem. No matter which approach to 
Liar-type sentences we examined, it turned out that the success of 
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a particular solution was due to the fact that the model language 
we were dealing with achieved the features we wanted it to have 
in virtue of lacking the expressive power of natural languages. 
Since languages we built lack some important features of natural 
languages, those models are inadequate. 
Three approaches to these problems that were covered in 
this paper are orthodox, paracomplete and paraconsistent. The 
orthodox approach was represented by Tarski and its name comes 
from the fact that it maintains the rules of classical logic. As it was 
demonstrated by Tarski’s theorem, the truth predicate cannot be 
defined in the object language, so a hierarchy of fixed levels is 
created to accommodate for the use of the notion of truth. Thus, 
Liar-type sentences, since they contain a truth predicate and talk 
about themselves, are not well-formed and the Liar paradox is 
dissolved. Kripke’s paracomplete approach differs by rejecting the 
law of the excluded middle, that is by rejecting bivalence. 
Alongside true and false, there is a third value of undefined that is 
ascribed to sentences which are ungrounded, for example the Liar-
type sentences. The third approach is paraconsistent, here 
represented by Priest. Paraconsistency means rejecting the 
explosion principle, or in other words not everything is provable 
from a contradiction. Although it is not necessarily so, 
paraconsistent approaches can be viewed as having three values, 
like in the case of paracomplete logic, but with the third value 
being both true and false, again an example being Liar-type 
sentences.  
What all of these approaches have in common is that they 
are inade- quate in a sense as used above. There are some 
important features of natural languages that these models do not 
achieve. The feature that was shown in this paper is expressivity, 
or more precise being able to express its own result. This was 
demonstrated by producing strengthened Liar sentences, also 
known as revenge of the Liar. Expressing these sentences required 
from each language to use semantic notions they introduced to 
solve the Liar paradox in a new setting, which resulted in new 
paradoxes. Nevertheless, the work done was not in vein. As it was 
explained in the Introduction, the notion of truth has transformed 
from a forbidden term to a concept that is widely discussed and 
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